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Abstract
Decisions-makers often rely on information supplied by interested parties. In prac-
tice, some parties have easier access to information than other parties. In this light, 
we examine whether more powerful parties have a disproportionate influence on 
decisions. We show that more powerful parties influence decisions with higher prob-
ability when their stakes are sufficiently large. However, in expected terms, deci-
sions do not depend on the relative strength of interested parties. When parties have 
not provided information, decisions are biased towards the less powerful parties. 
Finally, we show that compelling parties to supply information destroys incentives 
to collect information.
Keywords Information collection · Communcation · Interest groups · Decision-
making
JEL Classification D72 · D78 · D82 · H39
 
Practical politicians and journalists have long understood that small ’special 
interest’ groups, the ’vested interests’, have disproportionate power...[a group] 
will sometimes attain its objective even if the vast majority of the population 
loses as a result.
— Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, p. 127–128.
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There will be no economic or social questions that would not be political ques-
tions in the sense that their solution will depend exclusively on who wields the 
coercive power, on whose are the views that will prevail on all occasions.
— Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, p. 107.
So that the population of these civilized countries now falls into two main 
classes: those who own wealth invested in large holdings and who thereby 
control the conditions of life for the rest; and those who do not own wealth 
in sufficiently large holdings, and whose conditions are therefore controlled 
by these others...It is a division between the vested interests and the common 
man.
— Thorstein Veblen, The Vested Interests and The Common Man, p. 160–161.
All privileged and powerful classes, as such, have used their power in the 
interest of their own selfishness...
— John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy, Book IV, p. 133.
1 Introduction
In June 2018, the Dutch government and energy companies Shell and ExxonMobil 
reached an agreement to gradually reduce and eventually stop gas extraction in the 
Northern Netherlands. This agreement was a response to hundreds of earthquakes 
associated with gas extraction.1 One year later, Dutch Parliament demanded a thor-
ough investigation into past Dutch gas policies. The main question this investigation 
is supposed to address is how the Dutch government has weighed the interests of the 
citizens living close to the gas fields against the interests of the large energy com-
panies. In the background of this question was the fight between two lobby groups 
with unequal power. Specifically, in 2013, after having learnt that gas extraction 
has caused hundreds of earthquakes, the Dutch government gave permission to the 
energy companies to extract the highest level of gas in 30 years. Only in 2018, an 
agreement has been reached more in line with the citizens’ interests. However, for a 
long time the energy companies have been permitted to increase gas extraction in an 
area plagued with the adverse consequences of this extraction.
In a wide variety of situations, people make decisions on the basis of informa-
tion supplied by other people. Often those who provide information have a “stake” 
in the final decision. One example is the one discussed above, where every year the 
Dutch government decides how much gas energy companies are allowed to extract 
in Groningen, and interested parties try to influence these decisions. Another promi-
nent example of such a situation is a civil lawsuit involving a dispute between two 
parties about a distributional issue. Each party supplies information in an attempt 
1 Several hundreds of earthquakes have been reported in Nothern Netherlands. Most of them are associ-
ated with gas extraction (Foulger et al. 2018). The largest was in 2012, an M
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to influence the judge’s decision in its own favor. Another well-known example is 
a politician who makes a decision that affects various interest groups. Again each 
group may provide information with an eye on influencing the politician’s final deci-
sion to its own benefit. When decisions are made on the basis of information pro-
vided by interested parties, there are usually two (related) concerns. First, interested 
parties have incentives to reveal information that is favorable for them, but to con-
ceal information that is unfavorable for them. As a result, the decision maker pos-
sibly does not hear all available information. Second, the means of interest groups 
vary widely. An implication is that decisions may be biased towards the interests of 
groups with easier access to information.
The main objective of this paper is to shed light on these two concerns. To this 
end, we develop a game-theoretical model in which a neutral person has to resolve a 
distributional dispute between two parties; say, an amount of money is to be distrib-
uted. The socially optimal decision depends on the state of the world. The parties, 
however, have opposite interests that do not depend on the state of the world. As to 
learning the state, the decision maker has to rely on information provided by the par-
ties. We assume that the parties do not observe the state of the world,2 but each party 
can exert effort to find verifiable information about it. The more effort a party puts 
in collecting information, the higher is the probability that a party receives verifiable 
information about the state. If information is found, a party has to determine whether 
to reveal or conceal it. An important feature of our model is that parties may differ 
in the (marginal) cost they attach to exerting effort. The implication is that there is a 
relatively advantaged party and a relatively disadvantaged party. In this way, we are 
able to address the concern regarding the influence of powerful interest groups on 
decisions. Another important feature of our model is that given the available infor-
mation, the decision maker aims at making the socially optimal decision.
We derive four main results. The first one is neither novel nor surprising. Parties 
reveal information that promotes their interests, but conceal information that dam-
ages their interests.
Our second result is more subtle. The party that is relatively advantaged in terms 
of collecting information has stronger incentives to reveal it. The reason for this 
result is that when the advantaged party does not reveal information, the decision 
maker is inclined to believe that the party has something to hide. As a result, when 
neither party presents evidence, the decision is biased towards the interest of the 
disadvantaged party.
Third, in expected terms, the final decision does not depend on the relative 
strength of the parties. This neutrality result sheds light on the role of powerful 
interest groups in politics. Our model predicts that indeed relatively powerful inter-
est groups frequently provide information that shapes policy. However, our model 
also predicts that if powerful interest groups do not provide information, decisions 
are made against their interests. In expected terms, these effects cancel out because 
of the Martingale property.
2 In Sect. 8 we show that our main results also hold when parties observe the state of the world but must 
exert effort to communicate information.
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Our final result is that a policy that compels parties to reveal information destroys 
their incentives to collect information.
Together our results indicate that the concern that interested parties have incen-
tives to conceal information is justified. However, compelling parties to supply 
information does not help. It would only weaken incentives to collect informa-
tion. The concern for biased decisions because some parties have easier access to 
information than others is less justified. Rational decision makers take the relative 
strength of parties into account in such a way that differences in the power of parties 
do not lead to biases in decisions.
It is important to point out from the outset that we obtain our results from a model 
of informational lobbying in which the decision maker is unbiased. Of course, if the 
decision maker is biased or can be bribed our result that in expected terms the rela-
tive power of parties is irrelevant does not hold any more.
2  Literature
Our paper is related to two broad strands of economic literature. First is the literature 
on law and economics; researchers have investigated attorneys’ incentives to col-
lect and convey information in adversarial systems. An early paper is by Milgrom 
and Roberts (1986) who show that communication between interested parties with 
opposed interests leads to full-information decisions. Crucial assumptions for this 
result are (1) that information can be credibly transmitted, and (2) that parties are 
fully informed. When parties are not always fully informed, full revelation disap-
pears (Austin-Smith 1994; Shin 1994). Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) show that 
parties with opposing preference have also strong incentives to collect information 
(Dur and Swank 2005; Kim 2014). In the literature on adversarial systems, our paper 
is closest to Sobel (1985), who examines parties’ incentives to report information in 
case of a dispute over an indivisible asset. As in our paper, in Sobel one party might 
be more advantageous in reporting information than the other party. Sobel exam-
ines how different rules of proof of evidence affect parties’ incentives. Our paper 
deviates from Sobel in that we focus on a dispute over a divisible asset. Moreover, 
we explicitly distinguish between incentives to collect information and incentives to 
transfer information.
Second, our paper is related to the voluminous literature on interest groups.3 
Olson (1965) argues that smaller groups face lower costs to organize themselves, 
and consequently may have a disproportionate influence on policy. In Tullock (1980) 
and Becker (1983) interest groups decide how many resources to spend on lobby-
ing. The amount of resources affects the probability of influencing the decision. It 
is this type of literature that predicts that an interest group with more resources has 
a bigger say in policy decisions. The early literature on lobbying posits the exist-
ence of an influence function describing how lobbying efforts affect policy. Potters 
and van Winden (1992) provide a micro-foundation for these influence functions. A 
3 For surveys, see Mitchell and Munger (1991), Mueller (2003) and Austen-Smith (1997).
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key assumption of their model is that an interest group possesses information that 
is relevant for a legislator. By paying a cost an interest group can credibly transmit 
information to the legislator. Potters and Van Winden show that the more the pref-
erences of the interest group and the legislator are aligned, the wider is the scope 
for information transmission.4 Austen-Smith and Wright (1992), like us, model two 
groups that try to influence the decision of a legislator. Each group decides whether 
or not to become informed. This decision is observed by the legislator. Next, the 
two groups send messages to the legislator who makes the final decision. Our model 
deviates from Austen-Smith and Wright in three main respects. First, in our model, 
the decision and states are continuous rather than binary. Second, in our model, the 
decision-maker does not observe whether or not parties are informed. Finally, one 
of the main questions we address is whether more powerful interest groups have a 
bigger say in decisions, whereas the model by Austen-Smith and Wright is very suit-
able for understanding groups decisions on whether to lobby or not.
Similarly, some studies consider a group’s choice of whether to use informational 
lobbying for influence or whether to use an alternative instrument such as campaign 
contributions (Bennedsen and Feldmann 2006) or political pressure (Dahm and 
Porteiro 2008). These models, though closely related to ours, are more suitable for 
understanding groups choice of the type of instrument to use for influence. Cotton 
(2012) considers the question of whether rich groups have a disproportionate influ-
ence on policy in a model where contributions determine access to the politician. 
They show that rich interest groups gain more access than poor groups, but that they 
are not better off compared to poor groups due to the politicians rent extracting strat-
egy. While Cotton’s focus is on the influence of strong groups due to better access to 
politicians, our focus is on the influence due to better information collection capa-
bilities. Grossman and Helpman (2001) develop a cheap-talk model where interest 
groups are fully informed, but information is not verifiable.5 Their model too is more 
suitable to understand group decisions on whether to lobby or not. Moreover, their 
focus lies on the requirements for credibility when talk is cheap. They show that 
credibility improves with the amount of resources a group spends and thus provide 
a rationale for why interest groups spend more than is necessary to communicate 
messages. Lastly, common knowledge of the marginal cost of information collection 
allows the decision maker in our model to make an unbiased decision, which points 
towards the benefits of lobbying disclosure laws. In contrast, Denter et  al. (2014) 
model lobbying as a contest between groups to show that mandated transparency of 
lobbying costs leads to an over-investment by groups and decreases expected alloca-
tive efficiency.
4 See also Grossman and Helpman (2001).
5 See also Krishna and Morgan (2001) and Visser and Swank (2007).
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3  The Model
Our model describes a situation where a decision has to be made with important 
distributional consequences. One can think of, for example, the allocation of a tax. 
We assume that it is common knowledge that there is a socially optimal decision in 
the sense that reasons may exist why one party should be favored to the detriment of 
another party. To learn these reasons, the decision maker relies on the information 
supplied by the interested parties. We consider a setting in which each party wants 
to make a case for itself.
A decision maker has to choose x, where x ∈ [l, h] . One can think of the deci-
sion maker as a politician, a CEO, or a judge. The problem is that the proper deci-
sion is uncertain. This uncertainty is reflected by the stochastic term  , the state of 
the world, which is uniformly distributed6 on the interval [l, h]. The decision maker 
chooses x so as to minimize the expected deviation of x from  , given the informa-
tion (I) it possesses: minx ∶ E(|x − | |I).
To learn  , the decision maker has to rely on information provided by two inter-
ested parties, i ∈ {a, b} . One can think of a party as an interest group, a manager of 
a division, or an attorney. Neither party knows  initially. However, each party may 
collect information to learn  and receive a signal si ∈ {,} . Collecting informa-
tion is costly. Specifically, we assume that each party i chooses effort i ∈ [0, 1) , 
where i denotes the probability with which party i finds verifiable information 
about  , si =  . With probability 1 − i party i does not find information, si =  . 










An important feature of our model is that a may differ from b . If 𝜆a < 𝜆b , we 
say that party a is the more powerful party. The parameter i may capture a few 
things. First, i may depend on the resources party i possesses to collect information. 
Second, the efficiency with which a party collects information may affect i . Third, 
i may depend on party i’s position in the economy. For instance, information about 
the impact of a deregulation in an industry often lies in the hands of that industry. In 
this paper, we take a broad view of the various factors that may determine i.
We assume that the two parties have opposing preferences. Party a wants the 
decision maker to choose a high value of x, whereas party b wants the decision 
maker to choose a low value of x. The payoffs to party a and b are given by:
and











(h − l) , an equilibrium exists in which party i chooses 
i
= 1 






(h − l) , we ensure that the model focuses on environments where both parties have incentives to 
collect information. This is the most relevant environment to investigate how the relative strength of par-
ties affects decisions.
6 The uniform distribution does not alter our results qualitatively. See also footnote 9.
133
1 3
Do More Powerful Interest Groups Have a Disproportionate…
respectively.
After the parties have collected information, the communication stage starts. In 
this stage, the two parties simultaneously send a message, mi , to the decision maker. 
A party conditions its message on the information it received, mi(si) . We assume 
that information cannot be forged but can be concealed. Thus, if party i did not find 
information in the collection stage, it cannot supply information, mi() =  . If, by 
contrast, party i found information, say si = � , it either sends mi(�) = � (reveals) 
or sends mi(�) =  (conceals). After the parties have sent their messages, the deci-
sion maker chooses x.
We assume that the structure of the game and the distribution of  is common 
knowledge. Our model is a dynamic game with imperfect information. We solve it 
by backward induction and identify Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE). The decision 
maker chooses x so as to minimize E(|x − ||ma,mb) . Parties anticipate the decision 
maker’s decision rule.
4  The Communication Stage
Each party enters the communication stage either with the possibility to present evi-
dence to the decision maker or without this possibility. This depends on whether or 
not a party was successful in the information collection stage. We call a party that is 
able to reveal information “informed”, and a party that is not able “uninformed”. By 
assumption, an uninformed party sends mi() =  . The question remains for which 
values of  an informed party sends mi() =  and for which values of  it sends 
mi() =  . Proposition  1 presents the equilibrium communication strategy of an 
informed party.
Proposition 1 In a PBE, parties’ communication strategies can be characterized 
by a single threshold, T . An informed party a chooses ma() =  if and only if 
 ≥ T = E(|ma = mb = ) . An informed party b chooses mb() =  if and only 
if  ≤ T.
Proposition 1 is an implication of our assumption that the parties have opposing 
preferences. Information that is favorable for party a is unfavorable for party b, and 
vice versa. At  = T , both parties are indifferent between revealing information 
( mi() =  ) and concealing it ( mi() =  ). The decision of a party to reveal infor-
mation or not is only relevant in case the other party does not reveal information. As 
the decision maker chooses x =  if either party reveals information, mi(si) is not 
relevant if m−i() =  . So, to determine party a’s decision whether or not to report 
information, suppose mb(sb) =  and sa = � ∈ {l, h} . Clearly, ma(�) =  induces 
the decision maker to choose x = E(|ma = mb = ) , while ma(�) = � induces the 
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decision maker to choose x = � . Hence, party a is indifferent between ma(�) = � 
and ma(�) =  if,
For party b, the same equation can be derived.
A direct implication of Proposition 1 is that in case both parties are able to pro-
vide evidence, the decision maker makes the full-information decision. This result 
is similar to the result derived by Milgrom and Roberts (1986) that competition 
between informed parties whose preferences are opposed leads to full-information 
decisions. Proposition 1 also implies that parties never provide evidence that con-
flicts with their own interests.
5  Information Collection
We now turn to a party’s decision on how much effort to put in collecting verifiable 
information. Consider party a. When choosing a party a anticipates that it will only 
reveal information in the communication stage if  ≥ T . Moreover, it anticipates 
that if party b finds information, it will reveal it if and only if  ≤ T . Finally, it 
knows that revealing  leads to x =  . The expected payoff to party a when choosing 
a equals,
The first (second) term of (4) pertains to the range of  for which party a (b) reveals 
information if it is found. The third term gives the cost of effort.




Pr( ≤ T ) =
(T−l)
h−l
 , we attain8
Equation (5) shows that the higher is the deviation of T from h, the more effort party a 
puts in collecting information. Of course, the reason for this result is that the deviation 
of T from h is directly related to the probability that party a will utilize its information. 
To put it somewhat differently, party a has stronger incentives to collect information 
when it anticipates that the information is likely to be favorable to its cause. Obviously, 
it also has stronger incentives when the cost of collecting information is small.
In a similar way, one can derive the amount of effort party b exerts:
(3)�T = E(|ma = mb = )
(4)
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Note that party b’s effort strategy is the converse of party a’s strategy. When party 
b anticipates that it is likely to find information that is favorable to its cause, it has 
strong incentives to collect information.
6  The Threshold T
In Sect.  4, we have identified the communication strategies of the two parties. In 
these strategies, the threshold T plays an important role. Party a reveals informa-
tion if and only if it has found that  ≥ T , while the opposite holds for party b. In 
the previous section, we have examined the incentives of parties to collect informa-
tion. Again the threshold T turned out to be important. In the present section, we 
use parties’ strategies to determine the threshold T.
In Sect. 4, we have shown that the threshold T equals the expected value of x, 
conditional on ma =  and mb =  . The decision maker knows that if both parties 
had found information, one of them would have revealed it. He can therefore infer 
from ma =  and mb =  that at most one party found information. As a conse-
quence, parties not revealing information can be a result of three events. First, party 
a found information, but decided not to reveal it. Then, 𝜇 < 𝜇T . Second, party b 
found information, but decided not to reveal it, so that 𝜇 > 𝜇T . Third, neither party 
found information. As a and b are independent of  , in the third event the expected 
value of  equals 1
2
(l + h) . Together these events imply the following expression for 
T,
which can be rewritten as,
To better understand how T depends on a and b , first suppose that a = b . Then, 
(8) reduces to T = 1
2
(l + h) . This implies that in the absence of information, the 
decision maker chooses a neutral decision when parties exert the same amount of 
effort. Now suppose a = b . Straightforward, but tedious, algebra shows that T is 
increasing in b and decreasing in a . A direct implication is that for 𝜋a > 𝜋b , in the 
absence of information, a decision is made that is biased against party a. The intui-
tion is straightforward. If 𝜋a > 𝜋b , the decision maker attributes a relatively high 
probability to the event that party a possesses information. Consequently, in case 
neither party provides information in the communication stage, the decision maker 
is especially suspicious that party a wants to hide information. Likewise for 𝜋b > 𝜋a 
and ma =  and mb =  , a decision is made that is biased against party b.
The effect of a = b on the decision on x influences parties’ incentives to collect 
information. Recall that party a’s effort equals a =
(h−T )2
2a(h−l)






























+ (1 − a)(1 − b)
(8)
(T )2(a − b) + 2
T [h(1 − a) − l(1 − b)] − h
2(1 − a) + l
2(1 − b) = 0
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the higher is a . Again, this effect has a clear intuition. Party a anticipates that in 
case the decision maker does not receive information about  , he will make a deci-
sion that is biased against its interest. This gives a stronger incentive for party a to 
collect information.
Proposition 2 In equilibrium, T is implicitly determined by (8). If 𝜆i < 𝜆−i and 
ma = mb =  , a decision is made that is biased against party i.
Proof See “Appendix”.   ◻
Proposition  2 sheds a new light on the claim that powerful interest groups are 
able to put a stamp on policy. Our model predicts that indeed powerful interest 
groups frequently provide evidence that heavily influences policy. In this sense, it is 
true that powerful interest groups have a disproportionate influence on policy. How-
ever, we have also shown that in case a powerful interest group does not provide 
information, the decision is biased against its interest.
The next proposition shows that the relative strength of interest groups does not 
affect the expected decision on x.
Proposition 3 In expected terms, the value of i relative to −i does not affect the 
decision on x.
Proof See “Appendix”.   ◻
Proposition 3 is a direct implication of the Martingale property and we interpret 
it as a neutrality result. Of course, when one of the assumptions of our model is 
relaxed the neutrality result may break down.9 For example, we have assumed that 
the decision maker knows the relative strength of parties. If the decision maker were 
to have a wrong perception of i , the neutrality result would no longer hold. Under-
estimation of the relative strength of a party induces the decision maker, in expected 
terms, to choose a policy that is favorable for that party. It is also important to 
emphasize that the neutrality result only holds for informative lobbying. Evidently, 
allowing for bribes may alter our results since they will directly influence the prefer-
ences of the decision maker.
7  Forcing Parties to Reveal Their Information
In the previous sections we have analyzed incentives of parties to collect and sup-
ply information. We have shown that a party only reveals information that bene-
fits its cause. In the current section we examine the implications of a policy that 
9 It is important to note that relaxing the assumption that  is uniformly distributed does not break down 
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forces each party to reveal its information, whether that information is favorable 
for it or not. Such a policy in our model is akin to the assumption that informa-
tion cannot be concealed. Consequently, the communication strategy of party i 
becomes: mi(si) =  for si ∈ [l, h] , and mi() =  . Note that in this setting the 
expected value of  when the decision maker does not receive information equals 
E(|ma = ,mb = ) = 12 (l + h).
The resulting model revolves around information collection. When choosing the 
amount of effort to exert, parties anticipate that any information they find will be 
revealed, leading to x =  . Thus, the expected payoff to party a when choosing a is,
The first term is the expected payoff in case neither party finds information. The sec-
ond term is the expected payoff in case either of the two (or both) parties find infor-
mation. The last term is the cost of effort. The first-order condition with respect to 
a implies that the amount of effort party a exerts is a = 0 . Similarly, one can show 
that party b has no incentive to collect information. Hence, compelling parties to 
reveal their information completely eliminates their incentives to become informed. 
This brings us to Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 A policy that compels parties to reveal their information eliminates 
their incentives to collect information.
Proposition 4 casts doubts on rules in legal systems that compel prosecutors to 
disclose exculpatory evidence to the defendant. One primary purpose of these rules 
is to ensure that all parties go to trial with as much knowledge as possible. Our result 
suggests that these rules may have an unintended consequence of discouraging par-
ties to collect information in the first place.
8  Costly Communication
So far, we have focused on a situation where parties have to exert effort to find infor-
mation. An alternative situation is that parties have information but have to make 
effort to convey it to the decision maker.10 To analyze the latter case, we assume 
that when choosing their strategies on effort, parties know  . In the new model, i 
denotes the probability that party i is able to provide verifiable evidence to the deci-
sion maker, and i can be interpreted as a measure of party i’s accessibility to the 
decision maker. Specifically, in the alternative game we have that (1) nature chooses 
 and reveals it to the parties, but not to the decision maker; (2) each party chooses 
















10 Empirical research suggests that interest groups expend resources to convey their messages to policy 
makers. For a review of empirical models of interest group influence see Potters and Sloof (1996) and 
Stratmann (2005).
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effort on the basis of  , i() ; (3) if party i is able to reveal information, it reveals it 
or conceals it; (4) the decision maker chooses x.
The assumption about the observability of  does not have consequences for the 
strategies followed in the communication stage. The communication strategies can 
again be characterized by a single threshold, T . Each party only reveals information 
when it perceives that it will lead to a more favorable decision.
Incentives to exert effort, however, are different in the present model. Because 
each party observes the state, effort is conditional on the state. The more favorable 
is the state to party i, the stronger are its incentives to exert effort.11 Moreover, if 
 ≤ T , party a does not exert effort, and if  ≥ T party b does not exert effort. 
Thus, either party a or party b tries to convey information.
The assumption about the observability of  does not affect our main result that 
in expected terms, the relative power of parties does not influence the decision on x. 
Of course, the reason is that also in the present model the Martingale property 




Do more powerful interest groups have a disproportionate influence on policy? We 
have shown in this paper that in an environment where interest groups try to influ-
ence decisions by concealing or revealing information, the answer to this question 
is in the negative. By often providing information, more powerful interest groups 
do frequently influence policies. However, when they abstain from providing infor-
mation, decisions are biased against their interests. In expected terms, these effects 
cancel out.
We regard our neutrality result as a benchmark. Interest groups may systemati-
cally affect policies in case the assumptions underlying our model are violated. For 
instance, we have assumed that the decision maker forms expectations in a rational 
way. In practice, this means that the decision maker should distinguish between 
cases where more powerful interest groups do not provide information and cases 
where less powerful interest groups do not provide information. Moreover, our neu-
trality result requires that the decision maker correctly assess the abilities of interest 
groups to collect information. Finally, we have ignored the possibilities that interest 
groups bribe decision makers and that decision makers may already have ideological 
preferences over policies.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creat iveco mmons .org/licen ses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, 
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the 







 for 𝜇 > 𝜇T and 
a






 for 𝜇 < 𝜇T and 

b
() = 0 for  ≥ T.
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Appendix
As mentioned in Sect. 3, we assume 𝜆i >
1
2
(h − l) to ensure that both parties have an 
incentive to acquire information. If i ≤
h−l
2
 , then i = 1 and the decision maker relies 
entirely on party i. To see this, suppose i ≤
1
2
(h − l) . Suppose that if ma =  , T = l . 
Then, party a chooses a so as to maximize,
yielding





First we show T is decreasing in a and increasing in b . (8) solves for,
This implies,
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a ≠ b
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⟹ : Assume 𝜋a > 𝜋b . Let T =
1
2
(l + h) + e , so e < 0 implies 𝜇T < 1
2
(l + h) . 
Substituting in (10) gives us,
The first term on the left is positive and the second is negative. Thus, if 𝜋a > 𝜋b , 
then e < 0 which implies 𝜇T < 1
2
(l + h).
⇐ : Assume 𝜇T < 1
2
(l + h) . Then (10) reduces to,
Since the second term on the left-hand side is negative, we must have 𝜋a > 𝜋b.




⇐ : Assume 𝜇T < 1
2
(l + h) . This implies 𝜋a − 𝜋b > 0 , thus,
⟹ : Assume 𝜆a < 𝜆b . Similar to the last derivation, we obtain,









































































































)(h − l + 2e
2
)2
> 0 ⟹ 𝜆b > 𝜆a
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Proof of Proposition 3
We need to show E(x) = E() . For simplicity, assume h = −l . This does not alter our 
results. In fact, below we show that this result holds for any general distribution func-
tion. If h = −l , then Eq. (7) implies that T is implicitly determined by,
We need to show E(x) = E() = h+l
2
= 0.
Substituting out E() = 0 , E
(




 , and E
(





and reducing the expression gives us,
Using (11) implies that E(x) = 0.
General distribution Here we show that this result also holds for any distribution 
function. Assume that the random variable  has a probability density function f () . 
Let p = Pr(𝜇 > 𝜇T ) = ∫ h
𝜇T
f (𝜇)d𝜇 . For this general case, Eq. (8) is given by,
which implies that the threshold is implicitly determined by the following,
Similarly, for the general case, the final decision in expectation is given by,
































































𝜋a𝜋b(1 − p)E(𝜇|𝜇 < 𝜇T ) + 𝜋b(1 − 𝜋a)pE(x|𝜇 > 𝜇T ) + (1 − 𝜋a)(1 − 𝜋b)E(𝜇)
𝜋a𝜋b(1 − p) + 𝜋b(1 − 𝜋a)p + (1 − 𝜋a)(1 − 𝜋b)
(13)
[1 − p𝜋a − (1 − p)𝜋b]𝜇
T = ⋯𝜋a(1 − 𝜋b)(1 − p)E(𝜇|𝜇 < 𝜇T )
+ 𝜋b(1 − 𝜋a)pE(𝜇|𝜇 > 𝜇T )
+ (1 − 𝜋a)(1 − 𝜋b)E(𝜇)
(14)
E(x) = 𝜋a𝜋bE(𝜇) + 𝜋a(1 − 𝜋b)
[
pE(𝜇|𝜇 > 𝜇T ) + (1 − p)𝜇T] +⋯
E𝜋b(1 − 𝜋a)
[
(1 − p)E(𝜇|𝜇 < 𝜇T ) + (1 − p)𝜇T] + (1 − 𝜋a)(1 − 𝜋b)𝜇T
(15)
E(x) = 𝜋a𝜋bE(𝜇) + 𝜋a(1 − 𝜋b)pE(𝜇|𝜇 > 𝜇T )
+ 𝜋b(1 − 𝜋a)(1 − p)E(𝜇|𝜇 < 𝜇T )⋯
+ [1 − p𝜋a − (1 − p)𝜋b]𝜇
T
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The last term in this expression can be substituted out using Eq. (13). Equation (15) 
reduces to,
Note that E(x) = E() if the second term on the right hand side equals zero. This 
follows directly from the law of total expectation, which states that we must have, 
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